Yemen turns Riyadh's Red Sea lifeline into a front line

Sanaa's expanding maritime and cross-border campaign is forcing Riyadh to defend the export routes, proxy formations, and southern buffer zones it once took for granted.

26.08.2026

By Mawadda Iskandar

Source: https://thecradle.co/articles/yemen-turns-riyadhs-red-sea-lifeline-into-a-front-line

Saudi Arabia's attempt to impose a new military and political balance in Yemen has brought it back to a war it spent years trying to leave behind.

The confrontation now stretches across several connected theaters: mobilizations and missile strikes inside Yemen, operations along the Saudi border, attacks on infrastructure deep inside the kingdom, and a naval contest running through the Red Sea, Bab al-Mandab, the Gulf of Aden, and the Arabian Sea.

Riyadh initiated the war in March 2015, expecting a short campaign that would restore its preferred government in Sanaa. More than a decade later, it faces an adversary with a far larger missile and drone arsenal, experience gained in successive wars, and the ability to threaten the waterways on which Saudi Arabia increasingly depends.

The informal truce that had largely restrained direct Saudi–Yemeni exchanges since 2022 began to unravel in July, when Saudi strikes on Sanaa Airport were followed by Yemeni missile and drone attacks on Abha Airport.

The return to direct confrontation has unfolded amid a wider regional war and severe disruption in the Strait of Hormuz. That setting has magnified every Yemeni move against Saudi shipping. The East–West Pipeline can carry crude from the kingdom's Eastern Province to Yanbu, bypassing Hormuz, but cargoes bound for Asia must still pass south through Bab al-Mandab. Sanaa has therefore found the point at which Riyadh's principal escape route becomes another exposed flank.

The Ansarallah-aligned Yemeni Armed Forces (YAF) describe the first stage of their campaign through three linked equations. The first is a “blockade for blockade” extending across the waterways surrounding Yemen.

The second targets Saudi-backed troop concentrations and supply lines “wherever they may be.” The third promises a direct response to attacks or violations of Yemeni airspace by striking strategic facilities inside Saudi Arabia.

Sanaa has warned that continued escalation would bring a second stage. Its demands would then move beyond the long-stalled roadmap, payment of public-sector salaries, reopening of roads, and lifting of restrictions on ports and airports.

The stated objective would become the end of Saudi military influence in Yemen, the withdrawal of support for Riyadh-aligned formations, and Yemeni control over the country's oil and gas wealth. The question confronting the kingdom is how much of that pressure it can absorb while keeping its own export system intact.

The blockade reaches Yanbu

Sanaa announced its maritime ban on 20 July, warning vessels dealing with Saudi ports against sailing through waters within reach of the YAF. Tankers soon began reversing course or taking longer routes, while some Saudi-linked vessels stopped transmitting conventional tracking signals at certain points in their journeys.

Earlier this month, the campaign had pushed sections of the Saudi fleet into “dark” voyages as operators tried to obscure routes and destinations.

The timing was especially damaging for Riyadh. With Hormuz traffic sharply reduced, Saudi Arabia had redirected much of its crude and condensate exports to Yanbu. Kpler data showed that 75 percent of the kingdom's 5.29 million barrels per day (bpd) of crude and condensate exports in the first half of July left through the Red Sea terminal.

Yanbu is supplied by the East–West Pipeline, whose nameplate capacity is commonly placed near 7 million bpd. The terminal system, however, can sustainably load around 4.5 to 4.7 million bpd, according to Kpler, leaving far less room than the pipeline figure alone suggests.

Between 20 July and 19 August, YAF spokesman Brigadier General Yahya Saree said Yemeni forces had attacked eight Saudi oil tankers, five in the Red Sea and three in the Gulf of Aden and Arabian Sea. He also claimed that 48 other tankers had been compelled to turn back, including 14 in the Red Sea and 34 approaching through the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean.

Even without sinking a vessel, a credible threat can alter routes, raise insurance premiums, slow deliveries, and force operators to conceal movements. There was a 40 percent fall in Saudi oil-loading volumes at the Red Sea port during the blockade, while maritime reporting placed recent Yanbu crude exports near 3.8 million bpd before the decline. Every diversion adds to the costs borne by Riyadh, shipowners, and buyers.

Saudi Arabia has tried to send more crude north toward Egypt rather than south through Bab al-Mandab. Kpler data show cargoes using the SUMED system rising to 28.79 million barrels in July, compared with 19.52 million in April.

Tankers discharge at Ain Sukhna, after which the crude crosses Egypt by pipeline and is reloaded at Sidi Kerir on the Mediterranean. This route is workable, though it requires spare pipeline capacity, additional vessels, coordinated terminal slots, and buyers willing to accept different delivery arrangements. Kpler estimates that SUMED alone cannot carry all the crude Saudi Arabia has recently exported from Yanbu.

The strike on the Amzan on 24 August brought the confrontation close to the heart of this alternative system. Sanaa said a ballistic missile hit the Saudi tanker off Yanbu. Bahri, the kingdom's national shipping company, confirmed that the vessel had been involved in an incident and said its crew was safe.

UK Maritime Trade Operations separately reported that a tanker had been struck by an unknown projectile 63 nautical miles west of the port. The significance lay in the location. Yemeni forces had moved from threatening the route to approaching the export hub around which Riyadh built its Hormuz contingency.

Deterrence crosses the border

Maritime pressure has been accompanied by renewed attacks inside Saudi Arabia. The southern provinces of Jizan, Najran, and Asir contain airports, military sites, border installations, and Aramco facilities that supported the earlier war.

In July, missiles and drones were fired at Abha Airport after the strike on Sanaa Airport. By August, the YAF was claiming attacks on a sensitive target at Najran Airport and an Aramco installation in the same city.

Yanbu widens this target map considerably. It sits far from the Yemeni border and serves as the western terminus of the pipeline carrying crude across the kingdom. Pressure on Jizan, Najran, and Abha bears on Saudi military operations in the south; pressure on Yanbu reaches the oil infrastructure that allows the kingdom to operate when the Gulf route is constrained.

Together, these fronts are intended to force Riyadh to defend both the machinery of war and the revenue that sustains it.

Sanaa presents the operations as retaliation for Saudi attacks and an enforcement of Yemeni sovereignty. That framing is central to its deterrence strategy. By linking each strike to a prior Saudi action, the YAF seeks to establish that renewed intervention will incur costs beyond Yemen's borders.

Riyadh can still inflict enormous damage from the air, but it can no longer assume that the consequences will remain confined to Yemeni territory.

Supply lines under attack

The second equation is being applied to the military build-up inside Yemen. YAF operations have reached convoys and staging grounds from the Wadiah crossing and Al-Abr in Hadhramaut to positions in Marib and the western coast. The purpose is to interrupt the movement of weapons, troops, and vehicles before Saudi-backed forces can concentrate for a larger campaign.

Wadiah is the main land gateway between Saudi Arabia and eastern Yemen, while Al-Abr lies on the route leading west toward Marib. Strikes in this corridor place pressure on reinforcements arriving from the kingdom.

In Jawf, the YAF said it struck Saudi-backed mobilizations and weapons stores at Al-Kanais, a desert position near the administrative boundary with Marib and the Al-Labnat Camp. The surrounding roads connect eastern Jawf with Marib and northern Hadhramaut. The YAF has also struck deployments around Ruweik and other positions east of Marib city.

The heaviest exchanges have unfolded around Marib and Mokha. In early August, missile and drone strikes on government camps in Marib and Hadhramaut killed at least 30 soldiers.

Further attacks hit Marib and the Red Sea port of Mokha in mid-August, while government forces answered with operations on several fronts. On 17 August, Saree said ballistic missiles had struck a Saudi military landing vessel and four accompanying boats off Mokha.

Mokha matters because it is the logistical center of Tariq Saleh's UAE-backed forces and a potential launch point for operations farther north along the Red Sea coast.

Marib carries a different weight. It is the last major northern stronghold outside Sanaa's control and sits amid Yemen's most important oil and gas infrastructure. Pressure on both locations stretches Riyadh's allies between a coastal theater tied to Bab al-Mandab and an inland theater guarding the road east.

Three pressure points on the ground

The prospective ground battle is forming around western Taiz, the Red Sea coast, and Marib. In the Al-Barh area of Maqbanah district, the front runs across roads connecting Taiz with Mokha. Control of high ground and junctions there shapes the movement of supplies toward the coast.

A sustained advance would not immediately deliver Mokha, but it could narrow the routes available to the forces defending it and expose rear positions to missile and drone attack.

Farther west, the contest centers on Mokha and the coastal strip. Sanaa has combined strikes on military sites with pressure on port activity and reinforcement routes. The aim is to weaken Tariq Saleh's command structure and separate formations deployed north of the city from their logistical base.

Any attempt to push toward Hodeidah would require the opposing camp to keep that corridor open under fire, a far more difficult task than holding scattered positions during the relative calm that followed the 2022 truce.

Marib forms the third and most consequential axis. Sanaa-aligned forces retain positions west, north, and south of the city, including around Sirwah and the Balaq heights, and control districts taken during the 2021 campaign.

A renewed ground offensive would face fortified positions and could exact a high civilian cost, especially around displacement camps and populated areas. Yet the strategic prize remains clear. Control over Marib would deprive Riyadh's Yemeni allies of their principal northern base and give Sanaa greater leverage toward Shabwa and Hadhramaut.

A move along the Saudi border remains another option. The mountainous frontier opposite the historic Yemeni provinces of Jizan, Najran, and Asir was an active theater during earlier phases of the war, when Yemeni forces crossed into Saudi territory and seized military positions.

Riyadh's divided camp

Saudi Arabia also faces a less reliable coalition than the one it assembled in 2015. The UAE-backed southern camp has repeatedly clashed with Riyadh-aligned forces, and Abu Dhabi's priorities have centered on southern ports, islands, and coastal influence rather than restoring a Saudi-preferred order in Sanaa.

Southern Transitional Council (STC)-linked formations in Al-Dhalea may fight to defend their own front lines, but their willingness to enter a broader war on Riyadh's terms cannot be assumed. Tariq Saleh's forces on the western coast are likewise tied closely to Emirati support.

That leaves Riyadh increasingly dependent on Islah-linked networks, Salafi formations, and locally recruited forces in Marib and the east. Reports in April said Washington was reviewing whether to designate Islah and affiliated organizations as terrorist entities after lobbying associated with the UAE.

According to a Sanaa-aligned Yemeni report citing western diplomatic sources, Riyadh subsequently asked Washington to delay any designation of Islah, whose forces it still needs as pressure builds across Yemen's internal fronts.

These fractures bear directly on the conduct of the war. Each armed faction has its own patrons, territory, and postwar ambitions. Riyadh can supply money, weapons, and air support, but it cannot easily turn this collection into a unified force.

Sanaa, by contrast, is fighting under a centralized command and can move between the maritime, border, and internal fronts according to where pressure produces the greatest return.

Washington keeps its distance

The US has reasons to prevent a permanent Yemeni hold over Bab al-Mandab, yet renewed direct intervention would revive a campaign that failed to end Sanaa's maritime operations and carried high political and military costs.

Speaking at a panel last week convened by the Sanaa Center and Arab Center Washington DC, former US envoy Tim Lenderking warned that “the Houthis” could consolidate control over Bab al-Mandab, with serious consequences for Saudi Arabia, regional economies, and international trade.

He added that Washington was not currently working actively to prevent such an outcome and criticized the Trump administration for having largely “turned the page” on Yemen. His departing message to US officials in April, he said, had been: “Do not neglect Yemen.”

Riyadh has reportedly explored a large campaign along the western coast, presented as an effort to protect international navigation, alongside pressure from Marib and Jawf. Sanaa's strikes on Mokha, weapons depots, camps, and reinforcement routes can be read as a pre-emptive effort to disrupt those preparations before they produce a coordinated offensive.

Positions south of Hodeidah would become central if Saudi-backed forces tried to move north along the coast.

Israeli concern adds another layer. Lasting Yemeni leverage over Bab al-Mandab would keep shipping to Eilat exposed and raise the cost of trade between the occupation state and Asia. Egypt is often proposed as the Arab power with the naval weight and direct economic interest to help secure the strait, especially because disruptions also deprive the Suez Canal of revenue.

Cairo, however, remembers the cost of its 1960s intervention in Yemen and has little incentive to assume the ground burden that Saudi Arabia and its allies could not resolve.

The balance now turns on how much retaliation the Saudi economy and its divided coalition can withstand. Sanaa's three equations reinforce one another. Maritime operations expose the Red Sea outlet on which Saudi exports depend; cross-border strikes compel the kingdom to defend strategic infrastructure; attacks on mobilizations prevent its Yemeni allies from assembling freely.

Saudi Arabia still holds overwhelming advantages in wealth, air power, and access to advanced weapons. Those advantages did not produce victory in the previous decade, and the strategic environment has since turned against another open-ended campaign.

The YAF has emerged with longer reach, tighter command, and a clearer understanding of the pressure points surrounding the kingdom. If Riyadh chooses renewed military intervention, it may find that restarting the war is far easier than controlling what follows.