Ankara sets the course, Israel draws the lines in Syria

Damascus’s diplomacy now moves between Turkish patronage and Israeli firepower, with neither leaving much room for Syrian sovereignty.

08.09.2026

The Cradle's Syria Correspondent

Source:https://thecradle.co/articles/ankara-sets-the-course-israel-draws-the-lines-in-syria

The 23 August meeting between Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani and Mossad chief Roman Gofman marked the first publicly reported encounter of its kind. It was not, however, the first direct high-level contact between the post-Assad government and Israel.

Shaibani had already met Israeli Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer in Paris in July and August 2025 to discuss southern Syria, de-escalation, and security arrangements. The Amman encounter raised the channel from political bargaining to direct engagement with Israel’s foreign intelligence chief.

Syria's Al-Qaeda-rooted, self-appointed Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa once told his fighters that after Damascus, Jerusalem awaited them. Nearly two years after the fall of Bashar al-Assad, Israel occupies additional Syrian territory and continues its incursions, arrests of civilians, and seizure of land across the south. Damascus’s earlier threats against Israel have given way to advance notifications, mediated meetings, and repeated efforts to accommodate Israeli security demands.

From Abu al-Duhur to Amman

The timing of the Gofman meeting mattered. Days earlier, Israel struck Abu al-Duhur Air Base in Idlib Governorate, northwest Syria, near the Turkish border. At least eight bombs hit runways and hangars after Ankara sought to rehabilitate the facility, delivering a direct warning over the limits of Turkiye’s military role in Syria.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said Syria was preparing to violate the existing security arrangement by allowing a Turkish deployment at the base. “Our message was very clear: Don’t. I guess they didn’t quite understand the message,” he added.

Shaibani acknowledged that Israel had been informed before the strike that work at Abu al-Duhur was limited to repairing the runway and facilities damaged during the war. Syrian officials had explained the construction underway and denied that the base was being prepared for Turkish forces.

Tel Aviv bombed it anyway. By Shaibani’s own account, Syria is operating under Israeli tutelage if the rehabilitation of an airfield in the country’s north requires advance notice to the occupation, only for Israel to attack it regardless.

The choice of Jordan as the meeting place carried its own weight. Amman hosted talks on the Suwayda crisis and later joined Damascus and Washington in a formal roadmap intended to restore security in the southern governorate. A separate July ceasefire between Syria and Israel was backed by the US, Turkiye, Jordan, and other regional states.

Those arrangements followed the July 2025 bloodshed in Suwayda. A UN investigation found possible war crimes by government forces, tribal fighters, and Druze armed groups. More than 1,700 people were killed and nearly 200,000 displaced as homes and villages were looted or burned and both Druze and Bedouin civilians were driven from their communities.

Within days of the Amman meeting, Druze leader Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri sharpened his rhetoric, declaring that “we Druze are an inseparable part of Israel” and that the two sides share common ground “even in faith.” He also renewed calls for an independent entity. His words reinforced the impression that Suwayda was moving beyond the reach of Damascus and outside the main security bargain.

Security by Israeli permission

A Syrian Foreign Ministry diplomat informs The Cradle that the meeting produced a clear understanding aimed at preventing a clash between Ankara and Tel Aviv. Under it, Damascus would arrange Turkish movements inside Syria in coordination with Israel.

The source, who requested anonymity because he was not authorized to discuss the closed-door talks, describes the emerging rule in sharper terms. Syria’s political decision rests in Ankara because Damascus cannot escape Turkish influence, while the security decision rests in Tel Aviv. If those limits are crossed, bombing becomes the answer.

The diplomat declines to disclose what was discussed regarding Israel’s arrangements in southern Syria. Public reporting said the two sides considered establishing a special operations room in Jordan under US supervision to prevent a confrontation in Syria, including one involving Turkiye.

Incursions set the terms

Israeli attacks and ground incursions continued after the meeting. On the same day, Israeli troops raided Al-Rafid in Quneitra and detained a shepherd. They entered Saida al-Jolan and searched a nearby farm the following day, underlining how little the diplomatic channel had changed conditions on the ground. A Syrian monitoring group later recorded 267 Israeli violations during August alone and 1,752 from the beginning of 2026 through the end of that month.

Political analyst Jaafar Khaddour, a specialist in Israeli affairs who monitors southern Syria, tells The Cradle:

“It is as though the Israeli incursions are preparing the ground for a new reality that is awaiting announcement, while Syrian policy remains unclear about the means of power at its disposal and how it is managing this kind of threat.”

Khaddour adds:

“The strike on Abu al-Duhur revived the question of the United States’ ability to restrain Israel. At the same time, it revealed the extent of Syria’s engagement with security and military matters that Israel wants to make permissible. Israel appears intent on consolidating a ‘status quo’ that Turkiye has implicitly accepted, judging by the nature and sequence of the responses by the two sides, Tel Aviv and Ankara. In other words, the aim is to establish new rules of engagement.”

Khaddour describes Israel’s actions as part of a familiar regional policy of extending security control and imposing political realities on neighboring states. Damascus, in his view, had already offered a great deal and gone too far in what it conceded, yet the pressure only increased.

Israel’s declared objective is to retain leverage over Syria, expand its security zone, and shape the character of the government that emerged after Assad’s fall. The leadership may have changed, Khaddour argues, but Israel’s desire to weaken Syria and manage its future remains, particularly as Tel Aviv sees the country becoming an arena for Turkish influence and military expansion.

The meeting was significant because of the seniority of those present, but Khaddour sees little prospect of tangible results while Israel retained strategic territory and kept pressure on Suwayda, a file moving toward ever greater complexity.

A deal Tel Aviv will not sign

Syrian officials have repeatedly suggested that a security agreement was close. President Sharaa (the ex-ISIS chief formerly known as Abu Mohammad al-Julani) said in September 2025 that the two sides were “very close” to an accord. Yet nearly a year later, no agreement has been signed, and Israel continues to act without accepting the territorial limits Damascus seeks.

Shaibani said Syria had pursued an agreement through a full year of US-mediated negotiations. “We made considerable progress and reached a written formula for the security agreement that was accepted by both sides,” he said. “But Israel later backed away from its commitments and did not implement the agreed formula on the ground.”

He added that many Israeli security concerns had been incorporated into the talks. The Sharaa government was therefore offering to accommodate Tel Aviv’s demands in return for an agreement, but Israel still saw more value in preserving freedom of action.

Any binding arrangement could restrict Israeli operations in southern Syria, where Damascus has mounted no meaningful military response. Israeli forces have entered areas of Deraa, Quneitra, and the Damascus countryside without facing organized resistance from government troops.

A southern resident tells The Cradle that Interior Ministry personnel had even evacuated several checkpoints before Israeli forces advanced and occupied them. He requested anonymity for fear of arrest by the Syrian security services.

The Hebrew-language outlet Walla later quoted a senior Israeli political official as saying that the attempt to reach a security agreement had failed. “We tried to reach a security agreement, but ultimately it did not work,” he said.

The official blamed the easing of sanctions for reducing Syria’s incentive to compromise. The buffer zone was another central dispute. Israel would not accept an agreement requiring its withdrawal from territory it described as a “security asset.” Communication channels with Damascus nevertheless remained open at several levels.

Despite the harsher rhetoric between Tel Aviv and Ankara, the official said he did not believe either Israel or Turkiye wanted a direct exchange of fire. That assessment matched the purpose of the Gofman–Shaibani channel: managing their rivalry without limiting Israel’s operational reach.

Who takes the blame?

The Walla account conflicts with Shaibani’s insistence that Syria remains ready for an agreement. It also differs from a Turkish national security official’s assessment to Al-Monitor that Ankara remained skeptical of Israel’s willingness, rather than Syria’s, to accept one.

An Israeli political source likewise told Al-Monitor that Tel Aviv was moving to reduce tensions with Turkiye and Syria after the 18 August strike on Abu al-Duhur, partly to accommodate US President Donald Trump, who has pushed the parties toward an accord.

The Israeli official’s remarks to Walla therefore appear designed to shift responsibility. Under pressure from Trump, Tel Aviv can present itself as willing to sign while arguing that Damascus retreated once Washington lifted sanctions. The blame is placed on Syria and, indirectly, on the US.

Both governments have political reasons to keep the process alive. Trump could present an agreement as a diplomatic achievement following the damage inflicted by the war with Iran and ahead of the US midterms. Netanyahu, meanwhile, faces an approaching Knesset election and polls showing a fragmented electorate.

Concessions over occupied Syrian territory could weaken Netanyahu among his right-wing base. One late-August poll placed former Israeli chief of staff Gadi Eisenkot’s Yashar party on 24 seats, two ahead of Netanyahu’s Likud, although subsequent surveys have varied.

The Shaibani–Gofman meeting produced no clear or publicly announced agreement. For Damascus, it exposed the narrow boundaries within which it now operates. For Tel Aviv, merely holding the talks helped satisfy Washington while preserving the occupation’s freedom to bomb, raid, and redraw Syria’s security map.