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What the US troop drawdown means for post-Assad Syria



Analysis: Rather than complete disengagement, the drawdown reflects a shift in the US's risk calculus, but will it leave a vacuum that others could fill?



28.04.2025

By Francesco Salesio Schiavi *

Source: https://www.newarab.com/analysis/what-us-troop-drawdown-means-post-assad-syria



On 18 April, the Pentagon confirmed a significant reduction in US troop levels in Syria, marking a new phase in America’s military involvement in the country.


This move follows a brief surge in deployments during 2024 when the number of US personnel in Syria rose to 2,000 after roughly 900 in 2019. Now it’s being reduced back down to what Pentagon Spokesperson Sean Parnell described as a “conditions-based” presence of fewer than 1,000 troops.


As reported by the New York Times, Washington looks to close three bases in Syria, including Mission Support Site Green Village and Euphrates, all of which have enabled US forces to support Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) counter-Islamic State (IS) operations along the Euphrates River in zones where IS cells operate.


The drawdown coincides with profound changes inside Syria. The collapse of the Assad regime in early December 2024 was followed by the rise of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and the formation of a new provisional government under HTS leadership.


This fluid post-regime environment has altered the US calculus in the Levant, forcing Washington to choose: recalibrate engagement or risk leaving a vacuum others could fill.


Consequences for Syria and the SDF

Reducing the number of troops in Syria has been a goal of US President Donald Trump, who advocated for a sudden and complete withdrawal during his first term, though this was not fully enacted before he left office.


Since 2019, US forces have played a crucial role in stabilising northeast Syria after the territorial defeat of IS, helping local actors maintain governance and security functions. The planned drawdown thus marks a significant moment not only for counterterrorism efforts but for the broader regional balance.


The US forces in Syria are primarily based in the northeastern part of that country, with the stated mission of continuing the fight against IS. There is also the Al-Tanf base in southern Syria, along the borders of Jordan and Iraq. For over a decade, US forces across Syria have been subjected to attacks by Iranian-backed militias as well as IS, prompting frequent kinetic responses.


First, the drawdown raises urgent questions about the future of the Kurdish-led, US-backed SDF, the backbone of the international campaign against IS in the country. Yet, despite concerns over an American retreat, the SDF remains one of the most capable and structured forces in Syria, shaped by years of intensive US training and support.


"So long as Turkey and the PKK are engaging pragmatically toward a cessation of hostilities in Turkey, the SDF in Syria has better odds of surviving until it is integrated into the Syrian national armed forces," Nicholas Heras, Senior Director at the New Lines Institute, told The New Arab.


He added that key international stakeholders are likely to view the SDF as "a core part of Syria’s counterterrorism forces" in a post-Assad security architecture.


Heras also downplays the most alarmist takes on the drawdown’s implications, noting that unless the US fully exits both Syria and Iraq, the SDF retains strategic depth.


"So long as the US military is based in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and maintains the capability to support the SDF from Iraqi Kurdistan, the SDF still retains a position of strength."


Beyond combat, the SDF’s role in governance and border security makes its survival critical to northeast Syria’s stability.


Kawa Hassan, non-resident Fellow at the Stimson Centre, echoes that while the troop cut is significant, it must be understood against a backdrop of careful US political mediation. "The internal developments in northeast Syria are very interesting," he notes to The New Arab.


"Particularly on the political level, the US has been playing an important role in mediating between Damascus and the SDF, but also between the SDF and Turkey."


Thanks to the US's very active political mediation and deconfliction, the past few weeks have seen fewer clashes between the SDF and Turkish-backed forces and a reduction in Turkish drone strikes. He also highlights the US-facilitated March agreement between the SDF and HTS-led government, although the situation remains fragile.


However, Hassan warns that "one of the greatest risks is the resurgence of ISIS," emphasising that significant IS remnants remain active in Syria’s Badia desert and detention camps.


"I can't imagine a scenario whereby the US would fully withdraw without having reached an agreement between Damascus, the SDF, and Turkey to manage the security file," he says. Failure to do so, Hassan stresses, "will absolutely lead to enormous chaos," with ramifications reaching beyond Syria to Iraq and the broader region.


What does the drawdown signal about US policy?

Rather than complete disengagement, the drawdown reflects a shift in US risk calculus. According to Heras, Washington is signalling that it believes both the HTS-led transitional government and the SDF are "capable of working out an arrangement to actively prevent the reemergence of ISIS," even with fewer US boots on the ground.


In that sense, the move could be viewed as a bet on the resilience of Syria’s current counterterrorism architecture, with American support repositioned rather than withdrawn outright.


The Department of Defence maintains that the consolidation of forces reflects progress in the long-standing fight against IS and that remaining troops, along with CENTCOM’s airpower, can continue targeting terrorist threats. However, this justification aligns with broader US trends toward military "light footprints" and remote warfare.


The experience of the 2021 US withdrawal from Afghanistan still looms large. Policymakers remain wary of the risks of rapid disengagement, where security vacuums can quickly spiral into major crises. Syria, like Afghanistan and Iraq before it, presents a theatre where localised counterterrorism efforts and political stabilisation are tightly intertwined.


As part of the ongoing Strategic Dialogue, the planned US military withdrawal from Iraq by late 2025 further complicates the equation. Baghdad has already signalled tentative interest in extending the timeline, recognising the potential security vacuum that could emerge both from Iran’s proxies and a resurgent IS. As it was in the past, the fate of the US posture in Syria and Iraq remains constantly interconnected.


Regional ripple effects: Who fills the vacuum?


The drawdown might reverberate well beyond Syrian borders. In the south, the US base at Al-Tanf has long been a bulwark against Iranian logistical networks. Reducing troop numbers may offer Tehran and its allies, including Hezbollah, greater freedom to (re)consolidate supply corridors across Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, fulfilling their - so far lost - goal of a contiguous ‘Axis of resistance.’


Israel views the shift with deep concern. With fewer US forces and assets in place, Israeli security officials fear increased pressure to unilaterally contain Iranian activities, potentially escalating its covert and overt strikes across Syrian territory.


Meanwhile, Turkey, the main backer of Syria’s new HTS-led administration, is likely to view the drawdown as a boost to its already significant influence, particularly in northern and western Syria.


Neighbouring Jordan and Iraq could also face a fallout. An empowered Iranian corridor could threaten Jordan’s northern border stability, while Iraq fears a renewed IS campaign from across the porous Syrian frontier. In 2025, IS has carried out 51 attacks, with a staggering 50 of those in SDF-held areas. This clearly demonstrates the group's significant operational presence in these areas.


Despite some tactical successes by HTS, such as the disbanding of the Eighth Brigade and partial agreements with Kurdish communities, Hassan stresses that "the fundamental lack of a true, inclusive political process remains".


Without genuine reforms, he warns, "the HTS-led government risks replicating the same centralised, exclusionary patterns that eventually doomed the Assad regime".


The retraction also comes as Washington ramps up its posture elsewhere in the region, sending additional bombers and naval forces amid rising tensions with Iran. This bifurcation - stepping back in Syria while surging elsewhere - adds to the perception of a US strategy in flux.



*Francesco Salesio Schiavi is an Italian specialist in the Middle East. His focus lies in the security architecture of the Levant and the Gulf, with a particular emphasis on Iraq, Iran, and the Arab Peninsula, as well as military and diplomatic interventions by international actors


Follow him on X: @frencio_schiavi