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Syria deal with Kurdish forces hands Turkey a strategic win
Sharaa's agreement with the SDF satisfies many Turkish national security concerns but also removes a roadblock in peace process with the PKK
19.01.2026
By Ragip Soylu in Ankara
Source:https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/syria-deal-kurdish-forces-hands-turkey-strategic-win
When Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan returned from Washington in November after a series of high‑level meetings with senior US officials on Syria, he was upbeat.
“We’re fully on the same page with the Americans on Syria,” he reportedly told colleagues during a closed‑door meeting in Ankara around that time.
Fidan, careful not to overshadow Ahmed al‑Sharaa’s first visit to the White House, quietly joined the bilateral meeting between the Syrian president and Donald Trump in the Oval Office. His presence was later acknowledged, though no official photographs were released.
While in Washington, Fidan held separate discussions with Vice President JD Vance, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and US envoys Tom Barrack and Steven Witkoff, alongside the Syrian foreign minister and other senior officials.
Fidan told his colleagues after the meeting that he and the Americans had gone through the Syria file “map by map”, exchanging views and addressing Turkish concerns point by point, eventually reaching what he described as a clear understanding on key issues.
That understanding has since been on full display on the ground.
Earlier this month, Syria’s military launched an operation in Aleppo’s al‑Ashrafiyah and Sheikh Maqsoud neighbourhoods, areas held by the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) for years. Damascus accused the SDF of killing civilians with sniper and mortar fire.
Despite criticism from the SDF, US officials quietly endorsed the Syrian army’s advance, according to sources familiar with the discussions, a signal of growing American frustration with the SDF’s resistance to compromise.
The Kurdish-led SDF has long been a key US partner force in the fight against the Islamic State group (IS), and has been armed, trained and funded by Washington since 2015.
American troops continue to maintain a network of military bases and outposts across SDF-held northeastern Syria, officially to support the counter‑IS mission and safeguard critical oil fields under SDF control.
Experts believe the Syrian army wouldn’t have been able to attack the SDF without tacit approval from Washington.
The operation expands
Ankara, on its part, has long pressed the SDF to abide by the so‑called 10 March Agreement, which requires the group to integrate into state institutions and hand over public buildings and administrative control to Damascus.
SDF leaders instead advocated a federal or autonomous model, seeking to preserve their self‑rule structures and an independent chain of command.
Negotiations, expected to conclude by the new year, remained deadlocked, a situation that increasingly frustrated Turkish officials, who saw parallels with their own stalled peace process with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).
As the Syrian army reached a deal with the SDF to withdraw its remaining units from Aleppo, it quickly turned its attention eastward, declaring its intention to expel the group from the western bank of the Euphrates River.
Middle East Eye previously reported that Washington, echoing its stance in Aleppo, had asked the SDF to pull back across the river. The group refused.
The Syrian operation soon morphed into something much wider.
As government troops advanced near Tabqa, Arab tribal fighters rose up against SDF rule in Deir Ezzor and Raqqa, accusing the Kurdish‑led administration of discrimination and heavy‑handed governance. In response, Sharaa issued a presidential proclamation guaranteeing Kurdish cultural rights.
Throughout these events, the US‑led anti-IS military coalition, apart from low‑profile patrols and controlled leaks, watched largely from the sidelines, even as the SDF lost significant territory.
Meanwhile, US envoy Barrack held meetings with SDF commander Mazloum Abdi and Iraqi Kurdish leaders in Erbil in a last‑ditch effort to stabilise the situation, mostly ignoring the Syrian government’s progress on the ground.
Israel, traditionally one of the few governments opposing Damascus’s reconsolidation, remained silent. Syria and Israel, under US mediation, agreed in early January to establish a de‑escalation and intelligence‑sharing mechanism in Paris.
By Sunday, following days of fighting, Barrack met Sharaa, who subsequently announced a new ceasefire accord. The deal largely addressed Turkey’s longstanding security concerns.
In Ankara’s first reaction, the foreign ministry cautiously welcomed the agreement, expressing hope that it would “help stabilise Syria and safeguard its territorial integrity”.
Yet, if implemented in full, the deal marks a strategic victory for Ankara.
Under its terms, SDF fighters will be integrated individually into Syria’s defence and interior ministries after security vetting, effectively dissolving the group as an autonomous armed entity and reaffirming that the state holds a monopoly on force.
Control of oil and gas fields in eastern Syria will revert to Damascus, cutting off the SDF’s main source of revenue. Sharaa’s government is expected to allocate a portion of the proceeds to local authorities in Hasakah for infrastructure and local development.
The accord also places Deir Ezzor and Raqqa under direct government control and transfers all state institutions in Hasakah, where Kurds form a majority, back to central authority.
The SDF will retain only internal security functions within Hasakah and will hand over border crossings to Syria’s military, moving Syrian troops up to the border with Turkey, a longstanding Turkish demand to curb smuggling and cross‑border infiltration.
Finally, the SDF commits to expelling all non‑Syrian PKK members. The SDF is dominated by the People’s Protection Units (YPG), an offshoot of the PKK.
A chance for progress
In an unusual gesture last week, Turkish officials drew a distinction between the SDF and the PKK leadership in Iraq’s Qandil, praising Abdi for pragmatism while criticising the PKK’s commanders for “maximalist” positions.
If carried out, the accord could eliminate Turkey’s greatest fear, the emergence of a PKK‑aligned statelet in northern Syria, while protecting Kurdish cultural rights and granting limited local autonomy in Hasakah under a Kurdish governor and community forces.
The deal also weakens Israel’s influence over the SDF, which in recent months had grown closer to Israeli security networks in rhetoric and informal outreach.
Perhaps most importantly, successful implementation could clear the final roadblock in Turkey’s own peace process with the PKK.
Despite two-year-long negotiations, the Turkish parliament in January failed to propose a draft homecoming law which would suspend sentences or grant partial pardons for PKK fighters because of the dispute over Syria.
Turkey insisted on seeing concrete progress in the SDF’s integration before moving forward, while PKK leaders in Qandil refused to relinquish control over Syria’s northeast, viewing it as the crown jewel of the broader Kurdish movement.
Many PKK members delayed surrendering or leaving their mountain bases as a result.
With the Syrian file now largely resolved, Ankara and the PKK may have the opening to restart talks over disarmament and reintegration. Sources close to the process believe further political steps could follow.
The development has also strengthened the hand of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, who has taken an ambivalent but ultimately conciliatory stance on Syria, consistently urging compromise and peace.
Now, the Qandil leadership appears to have little choice but to heed his call of dissolution.
Sharaa's agreement with the SDF satisfies many Turkish national security concerns but also removes a roadblock in peace process with the PKK
19.01.2026
By Ragip Soylu in Ankara
Source:https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/syria-
When Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan returned from Washington in November after a series of high‑level meetings with senior US officials on Syria, he was upbeat.
“We’re fully on the same page with the Americans on Syria,” he reportedly told colleagues during a closed‑door meeting in Ankara around that time.
Fidan, careful not to overshadow Ahmed al‑Sharaa’s first visit to the White House, quietly joined the bilateral meeting between the Syrian president and Donald Trump in the Oval Office. His presence was later acknowledged, though no official photographs were released.
While in Washington, Fidan held separate discussions with Vice President JD Vance, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and US envoys Tom Barrack and Steven Witkoff, alongside the Syrian foreign minister and other senior officials.
Fidan told his colleagues after the meeting that he and the Americans had gone through the Syria file “map by map”, exchanging views and addressing Turkish concerns point by point, eventually reaching what he described as a clear understanding on key issues.
That understanding has since been on full display on the ground.
Earlier this month, Syria’s military launched an operation in Aleppo’s al‑Ashrafiyah and Sheikh Maqsoud neighbourhoods, areas held by the US-
Despite criticism from the SDF, US officials quietly endorsed the Syrian army’s advance, according to sources familiar with the discussions, a signal of growing American frustration with the SDF’s resistance to compromise.
The Kurdish-
American troops continue to maintain a network of military bases and outposts across SDF-
Experts believe the Syrian army wouldn’t have been able to attack the SDF without tacit approval from Washington.
The operation expands
Ankara, on its part, has long pressed the SDF to abide by the so‑called 10 March Agreement, which requires the group to integrate into state institutions and hand over public buildings and administrative control to Damascus.
SDF leaders instead advocated a federal or autonomous model, seeking to preserve their self‑rule structures and an independent chain of command.
Negotiations, expected to conclude by the new year, remained deadlocked, a situation that increasingly frustrated Turkish officials, who saw parallels with their own stalled peace process with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).
As the Syrian army reached a deal with the SDF to withdraw its remaining units from Aleppo, it quickly turned its attention eastward, declaring its intention to expel the group from the western bank of the Euphrates River.
Middle East Eye previously reported that Washington, echoing its stance in Aleppo, had asked the SDF to pull back across the river. The group refused.
The Syrian operation soon morphed into something much wider.
As government troops advanced near Tabqa, Arab tribal fighters rose up against SDF rule in Deir Ezzor and Raqqa, accusing the Kurdish‑led administration of discrimination and heavy‑handed governance. In response, Sharaa issued a presidential proclamation guaranteeing Kurdish cultural rights.
Throughout these events, the US‑led anti-
Meanwhile, US envoy Barrack held meetings with SDF commander Mazloum Abdi and Iraqi Kurdish leaders in Erbil in a last‑ditch effort to stabilise the situation, mostly ignoring the Syrian government’s progress on the ground.
Israel, traditionally one of the few governments opposing Damascus’s reconsolidation, remained silent. Syria and Israel, under US mediation, agreed in early January to establish a de‑escalation and intelligence‑sharing mechanism in Paris.
By Sunday, following days of fighting, Barrack met Sharaa, who subsequently announced a new ceasefire accord. The deal largely addressed Turkey’s longstanding security concerns.
In Ankara’s first reaction, the foreign ministry cautiously welcomed the agreement, expressing hope that it would “help stabilise Syria and safeguard its territorial integrity”.
Yet, if implemented in full, the deal marks a strategic victory for Ankara.
Under its terms, SDF fighters will be integrated individually into Syria’s defence and interior ministries after security vetting, effectively dissolving the group as an autonomous armed entity and reaffirming that the state holds a monopoly on force.
Control of oil and gas fields in eastern Syria will revert to Damascus, cutting off the SDF’s main source of revenue. Sharaa’s government is expected to allocate a portion of the proceeds to local authorities in Hasakah for infrastructure and local development.
The accord also places Deir Ezzor and Raqqa under direct government control and transfers all state institutions in Hasakah, where Kurds form a majority, back to central authority.
The SDF will retain only internal security functions within Hasakah and will hand over border crossings to Syria’s military, moving Syrian troops up to the border with Turkey, a longstanding Turkish demand to curb smuggling and cross‑border infiltration.
Finally, the SDF commits to expelling all non‑Syrian PKK members. The SDF is dominated by the People’s Protection Units (YPG), an offshoot of the PKK.
A chance for progress
In an unusual gesture last week, Turkish officials drew a distinction between the SDF and the PKK leadership in Iraq’s Qandil, praising Abdi for pragmatism while criticising the PKK’s commanders for “maximalist” positions.
If carried out, the accord could eliminate Turkey’s greatest fear, the emergence of a PKK‑aligned statelet in northern Syria, while protecting Kurdish cultural rights and granting limited local autonomy in Hasakah under a Kurdish governor and community forces.
The deal also weakens Israel’s influence over the SDF, which in recent months had grown closer to Israeli security networks in rhetoric and informal outreach.
Perhaps most importantly, successful implementation could clear the final roadblock in Turkey’s own peace process with the PKK.
Despite two-
Turkey insisted on seeing concrete progress in the SDF’s integration before moving forward, while PKK leaders in Qandil refused to relinquish control over Syria’s northeast, viewing it as the crown jewel of the broader Kurdish movement.
Many PKK members delayed surrendering or leaving their mountain bases as a result.
With the Syrian file now largely resolved, Ankara and the PKK may have the opening to restart talks over disarmament and reintegration. Sources close to the process believe further political steps could follow.
The development has also strengthened the hand of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, who has taken an ambivalent but ultimately conciliatory stance on Syria, consistently urging compromise and peace.
Now, the Qandil leadership appears to have little choice but to heed his call of dissolution.