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The Rojava project

By DOĞU ERGİL
d.ergil@todayszaman.com
17.05.2013
Source: todayszamann.com

The International Crisis Group (ICG), headquartered in Brussels, recently published a report titled “Flight of Icarus?

The PYD's Precarious Rise in Syria.” Like other reports by the group, it is a well-crafted, expert analysis of the subject with substantial information that may be important in shaping Turkish foreign policy towards this country and the unfolding Kurdish autonomy in Syria.

It is interesting that the report likens the political career of the Democratic Union Party (PYD) to Icarus, who flew too close to the sun with wings stuck together with wax.

The PYD was one of the Kurdish parties that existed under the heavy-handed regime of the al-Assad family, and after the start of the civil strife, as a vibrant opposition group that rallied a part of the Syrian Kurds to set up a regional government. The PYD is inspired by Turkey's Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which provided both a capacity for armed resistance and organizational structure.

Kurds were offered autonomy in the north of the country (called Rojava or Western Kurdistan) by Damascus, provided that they did not take part in the civil war. While the civil strife has dragged on for the past three years, Syrian Kurds have consolidated control over large portions of their country's north.

The party's armed wing -- the People's Protection Units (YPG) -- modeled after and mainly staffed by the PKK, “now dominate three large, non-contiguous enclaves of Kurdish-majority territory along the Turkish border,” according to the report. It protects the people of these territories from the various rebel forces who want to control the border area, from which they have received a substantial portion of their aid and logistical support.

Growing in confidence and power, the PYD declared autonomy in November 2013 and set up a transitional administration. Kurdish prominence and government is an unprecedented event in Syria. It shocked many actors, as well as the Turkish government, which is yet to solve its “Kurdish Problem.”

Will Kurdish autonomy in Syria help this chaotic country's future stability or lead to its partitioning among irreconcilable groups? This fact is unclear for the time being.

The report stipulates that “the PYD alone will not determine the fate of Syria's north, but it could greatly increase its chances by … cooperating with other local forces. For all its successes, the PYD's rise is in no small part illusory, attributable less to its own prowess than to its links with other regional forces. Perhaps most important is its de facto alliance with the regime while continuing to give material support to [northern] territories.”

However, the PYD's biggest supporter is Turkey's PKK, that has sister organizations in all regional countries with Kurdish minorities. Together, both parties are members of the umbrella pan-Kurdish organization called the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK).

The report continues: “With the PKK's backing, the YPG has become [north Syria's] strongest military force. … Ironically however, these same factors, crucial to the PYD's success, are also its Achilles heel. First, its PKK heritage has encumbered the party with a rigid, authoritarian culture and vague program that are out of sync with popular expectations. Heavy-handed governance prompts at best grudging acquiescence from a constituency whose younger generation, particularly, appears to aspire to something different.”

Damascus has maintained a continuous but rather invisible presence in PYD-controlled areas. Receiving state resources has helped the PYD survive and enhance its competitive edge over other Kurdish and non-Kurdish actors, “without which the Rojava project would wither.”

The PYD's competition for dominance with would-be allies, most importantly the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in Iraq, has created disappointment among Kurds. Turkey and Iran want to benefit from this uncertain environment, while the PYD acted to solidify its alliance with “Damascus, Iran and, to an extent, the [Iraqi Prime Minister] Nouri al-Maliki-led government in Baghdad.”

“These challenges raise questions about the depth and durability of the Rojava project,” the report claims, especially if it goes on “forsaking its natural allies for a partnership of convenience with the same regime that long denied [Kurdish rights]. What all peoples of northern Syria need, Kurdish and non-Kurdish, is a common strategy for dealing with both Damascus and the minority communities in the region. This would require that the PYD decrease its heavy reliance on its own military and the regime.”