The key trends set to shape the Middle East in 2026

Fragile ceasefires, regional rivalries, and unresolved conflicts are set to define the Middle East's political landscape in 2026

23.12.2025

By Giorgio Cafiero*

Source:https://www.newarab.com/analysis/key-trends-set-shape-middle-east-2026

With the new year less than two weeks away, a range of geopolitical and security trends demand close attention. From the potential resumption of war between Israel and Iran to evolving dynamics in multiple hotspots, a host of unresolved variables is poised to shape the Middle East’s trajectory in 2026.

In the new year, Israel will seek to further ascend as an unchallenged hegemonic force in the Middle East. How Tel Aviv goes about confronting the Islamic Republic, including what remains of the ‘Axis of Resistance’, and deploys its hard power to shape realities on the ground in post-Assad Syria, will impact the region in significant ways.

Israel and Iran: The fragile truce

A key development to monitor is the US-brokered ceasefire between Israel and Iran, which brought an end to the 12-day war of June 2025.

While the truce has largely held over the past six months, concerns persist that it could unravel in the months ahead. Notably, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is set to meet US President Donald Trump in Florida on 29 December, where he is expected to press for a resumption of hostilities.

The perceived Iranian nuclear threat has largely receded from the core of Israeli and American neo-conservative arguments for striking Iran, with attention now focused almost entirely on Tehran’s missile capabilities.

On 20 December, Israel’s military chief of staff, Lieutenant General Eyal Zamir, reportedly told US Central Command head Admiral Brad Cooper that Tel Aviv is deeply concerned about a recent missile exercise conducted by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, insisting that it could mask preparations for a surprise attack.

Describing this truce as “incredibly weak,” Dr Hussein Ibish, a senior resident scholar at the Arab Gulf States Institute, told The New Arab that “the Israelis are itching to resume their bombing campaign against Iran, and they may attempt to do that quite soon, perhaps in the first half of 2026”.

The mood inside Israel and the public’s overall attitude toward Iran are important. Dr Thomas Juneau, a professor at the University of Ottawa's Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, believes that Netanyahu’s government will be under “pressure from inside Israel in 2026 to exploit this window of opportunity to weaken Iran further” following the 12-day war, which enabled Israel to inflict massive damage inside Iran.

The crucial question is whether the White House will acquiesce to Netanyahu’s push to reignite the conflict. Yet, as Dr Juneau observes, Trump’s “highly unpredictable” disposition makes it exceedingly difficult to anticipate whether he will rein in or embolden the Israeli leadership regarding Iran.

Dr Gökhan Ereli, the Gulf Studies Coordinator at ORSAM (an Ankara-based think tank), emphasised the critical role of Washington in bringing Israel and Iran into a ceasefire that at least paused the 12-day war.

Yet, he also stressed how the fundamental drivers of hostility between Tel Aviv and Tehran remain in play, which should leave observers nervous about the conflict resuming next year.

“Even though the ceasefire ‘continues’ after six to seven months, the root causes of the Israel-Iran tension do not seem simple enough to be resolved by US military and political intervention,” he told TNA.

“Therefore, it can be argued that the US ceasefire has frozen this conflict…but not completely resolved it, and that this conflict will continue economically, politically, and perhaps militarily [throughout] 2026.”

Gaza: Tenuous 'ceasefire' and lingering uncertainty

It is extremely unlikely that 2026 will see the Palestinians achieve an independent and sovereign state free from Israeli occupation.

However, a central question for the year ahead is whether Trump’s “peace initiative” will advance while the October 2025 ceasefire holds - albeit tenuously, amid ongoing Israeli violations - or whether the truce will entirely collapse and give way to a resumption of Israel’s all-out genocidal military campaign against the enclave.

Given Israel’s track record of undermining ceasefires and diplomacy, as seen in Gaza in March 2025, there is ample reason to expect that military operations could resume if they receive Washington’s approval.

Since the Gaza ceasefire took effect on 10 October, Israeli forces have reportedly carried out more than 730 violations, including air and artillery strikes as well as direct shootings that have killed over 400 Palestinians.

The Miami talks on 19 December, which brought together representatives from the US, Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey, concluded with a joint statement urging all parties to uphold the ceasefire. Yet without consequences for future Israeli violations, there is little reason to expect restraint from Tel Aviv.

The pressing question remains whether Israel will seek to gradually undermine the truce through a steady series of limited operations or unilaterally shatter the truce and resume a full-scale military campaign as Israel did with the previous Gaza ceasefire on 18 March.

Dr Juneau said he was “very pessimistic” about the overall situation in Gaza. “Israel shows no inclination to further withdraw, Hamas is unlikely to disarm, and other pillars of Trump’s peace plan, notably the international stabilisation force, are unlikely to come to fruition,” he told TNA.

Syria's post-Assad challenge: Relative stability amid fragility

As Syria enters its second year of the post-Assad era, the early months of 2026 will reveal the extent to which President Ahmed Al-Sharaa’s government can establish stability under a unitary system.

A range of challenges could undermine a successful transition, including Israeli aggression, the further resurgence of the Islamic State (IS), and heightened tensions between minority communities and the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham-dominated authorities in Damascus.

“The ability of [the new] Syrian government to reunite the country in a stable, centralised, succeeding rather than failing state will be essential. If Israel gets its way and Syria remains chaotic and fragmented, it will almost certainly give rise to forces that are highly destabilising,” observed Dr Ibish.

“However, thus far the track record of the new government, while modest, is more reassuring than not.”

Syria’s prospects for stability in 2026 and beyond will hinge in large part on the support of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, Turkey, and European countries.

Since the fall of the former regime, rivalries within the GCC and between Turkey and certain Arab states have not undermined Syria, and in the year following Assad’s ouster, Gulf capitals and Ankara have largely aligned in their efforts to prevent state collapse.

Working in concert, they successfully lobbied the White House to lift US sanctions on Syria contrary to Israeli interests. Nevertheless, next year, it will be crucial to monitor emerging dynamics, as renewed competition among Gulf states or between Turkey and Arab capitals could reshape these relationships.

“The victory of Saudi Arabia over Israel in convincing the United States to embrace the new Syria was a remarkable triumph of Arab diplomacy. But the Trump administration had been seeking to draw the US forces from the country. The ISIS attack that killed Americans in Syria may reverse that trend, and in many ways, Donald Trump's Syria policy is his most impressive foreign policy that would almost certainly not have been adopted by a Democrat,” Dr Ibish told TNA.

“So, I think he's likely to keep US troops in Syria, and with a potential Turkish-Saudi entente to rebuild a centralised Syria that is stable and viable, its prospects are really quite decent,” he added.

The Emirati-Saudi rivalry: High stakes in Sudan and Yemen

Competition between the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia for regional leadership is likely to intensify in 2026, with developments in Sudan and southern Yemen emerging as key arenas to watch.

With global attention focused on Sudan following the Rapid Support Forces (RSF)’s massacres in El-Fasher in late October, Abu Dhabi faces increased scrutiny in the West for its backing of the paramilitary group.

In contrast, Saudi Arabia has adopted a more supportive stance toward the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), placing the two Gulf Arab monarchies at odds in a conflict that erupted in April 2023.

Among the UAE’s motivations for arming the RSF is a desire to assert an increasingly autonomous foreign policy in the Red Sea and Horn of Africa, highlighting Abu Dhabi’s pursuit of interests independent of Riyadh and other Arab capitals. Additional drivers include economic considerations and the ideological imperatives of the UAE’s anti-Muslim Brotherhood agenda.

However, Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 agenda is inextricably linked to stability along the Red Sea, where significant tourism investments are already taking shape. The ongoing conflict in Sudan and the risk of further escalation, therefore, weigh heavily on Saudi decision-makers.

In this context, officials in Riyadh regard a national military institution such as the SAF as far preferable to a militia like the RSF, which they view as unpredictable, institutionally weak, and lacking political legitimacy. Ultimately, Saudi policymakers seek a coherent governing authority in Khartoum capable of maintaining order and securing Red Sea ports. These are responsibilities that Riyadh does not believe the RSF can fulfil.

As Sudan’s war continues, escalating Saudi-Emirati competition in a fragmented country could have outsized geopolitical repercussions, profoundly affecting relations between the two Gulf powerhouses.

Recent developments in southern and eastern Yemen, where the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) has seized nearly all territory outside Houthi control, are set to play a central role in Abu Dhabi and Riyadh’s competition for influence.

After years of advocating for a unified Yemen, Saudi Arabia now views the STC’s recent advances as making a return to a North-South division increasingly likely.

Should this scenario unfold, northern Yemen could solidify under the Iran-backed Houthi proto-state with its capital in Sanaa, while the south coalesces around a UAE-backed entity centred in Aden, effectively sidelining Riyadh. With its influence increasingly constrained and options limited, Saudi Arabia may ultimately have little choice but to acquiesce to a UAE-backed STC government in the south.

While the situation remains fluid and the STC’s ability to consolidate these gains is uncertain, 2026 is likely to see Yemen increasingly serve as a stage for intra-GCC rivalries, particularly between the UAE and Saudi Arabia.

In any event, analysts caution that, given recent developments in Sudan and Yemen, 2026 is likely to pose significant challenges for the Emirati-Saudi relationship.

“Currently, due to the escalating situation in Yemen and especially in Sudan, a massive deterioration in relations between Saudi Arabia and the UAE is likely,” Wolfgang Pusztai, a senior adviser at the Austrian Institute for European and Security Policy, told TNA.

When asked about the most likely crisis scenario that could unfold in the Middle East in 2026, he said a “significant worsening of the relations between Saudi Arabia and the UAE”.

As Pusztai noted, “the Trump administration will certainly try to prevent this, as both are important allies, but means on hand are limited”.

What comes next

As 2026 begins, the Middle East faces a year defined less by certainty than by the precarious balance of competing ambitions, unresolved conflicts, and fragile alliances.

The tenuous Israel-Iran ceasefire, fears of Israel’s genocidal campaign restarting in Gaza at full speed, and the challenges confronting post-Assad Syria underscore how quickly regional dynamics can shift, with consequences reverberating all over and far beyond the region.

At the same time, the intensifying rivalry between Saudi Arabia and the UAE in Sudan and Yemen highlights how intra-GCC competition could reshape the region’s political and strategic landscape, particularly along the Red Sea and in the Horn of Africa.

Against this backdrop, external powers, including the United States, European actors, and Turkey, remain pivotal, yet their ability to stabilise outcomes is far from guaranteed.

Ultimately, 2026 is poised to test the resilience of existing partnerships, the effectiveness of diplomacy, and the capacity of regional actors to navigate a volatile environment without plunging into further conflict.

*Giorgio Cafiero is the CEO of Gulf State Analytics

Follow him on Twitter: @GiorgioCafiero

Edited by Charlie Hoyle