Turkiye’s drive in Africa: Where ambitions meet reality

As the US and France pull back from Africa, Turkiye is pushing forward with humanitarian projects, a growing military footprint, and arms exports. Yet Ankara’s ambitions remain constrained by political realities and contested outcomes.

10.08.2025

By Aidan J. Simardone

Source:https://thecradle.co/articles/turkiyes-african-drive-where-ambitions-meet-reality

Turkiye’s modern engagement with Africa began decisively in Somalia. In 2011, as famine ravaged the Horn of Africa and Al-Qaeda-affiliated Al-Shabaab overran much of southern Somalia, most western powers abandoned Mogadishu.

Aid was delivered remotely, often siphoned off by warlords, leaving a vacuum. The famine killed an estimated 260,000 people, half of them children under five, and cemented Somalia’s status as a failed state in western eyes.

Somalia: The gateway to the Gulf of Aden

Then-prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, broke ranks with western disengagement. Visiting Mogadishu – the first non-African head of state to do so in two decades – he pledged over $200 million in humanitarian aid, reopened the embassy, and oversaw the launch of Turkish Airlines flights, the first non-African carrier to resume service to the Somali capital in over 20 years. Unlike western countries, this aid would be delivered directly to avoid corruption and foster trust. Turkish charities, engineers, and businesspeople followed.

By 2014, Somali forces had regained much of the country from Al-Shabaab, a resurgence that came years after Ethiopia’s 2006 military intervention, backed by the US to dismantle the Islamic Courts Union, an operation that also pushed many fighters into the Al-Shabaab ranks.

Turkiye rebuilt Mogadishu’s port and airport, opened the Recep Tayyip Erdogan Hospital, restored key roads, and in 2017 established Camp TURKSOM – its first overseas military base. Nearly 5,000 Somali soldiers have since been trained there under joint Somali–Turkish command.

In early 2024, Ethiopia’s move to recognize Somaliland threatened to destabilize the Horn of Africa. Turkiye brokered the Ankara Declaration, reopening dialogue and leading to the restoration of diplomatic relations between Somalia and Ethiopia.

That same year, Turkiye and Somalia signed a 10-year naval defense agreement, officially approved by Somalia’s cabinet and legislature. The deal tasks Turkiye with training and equipping Somali naval forces, rebuilding the Somali navy, and conducting joint patrols in Somali waters to safeguard against piracy, terrorism, and foreign interference.

Somali leaders described the agreement as part of a broader effort to protect the country’s territorial waters and economic zone from illegal fishing and foreign encroachment. While some portray this as giving Ankara “control” over the Gulf of Aden, a vital maritime corridor through which roughly one-third of global trade passes en route to the Suez Canal, in reality, maritime security there is shared with multiple international naval missions, including those of the US, EU, China, and India.

That year, Somalia also signed an offshore exploration agreement with the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO). Contrary to some misinterpretations, the deal does not grant ownership of Somali oil. Instead, it allows TPAO to recoup up to 90 percent of annual production revenues until it recovers costs for seismic surveys, offshore drilling, and other operational expenses.

Given Somalia’s unstable security environment, these costs could take years – possibly decades – to recoup, delaying the point at which Somalia gains the majority of revenue. With estimated reserves of 30 billion barrels, comparable to some OPEC members such as Nigeria, the potential stakes remain high for both parties.

Libya: Maritime ambitions and political limits

Before NATO’s 2011 regime-change war, Turkiye and Libya enjoyed close political and economic ties under the late Muammar Gaddafi, including billions in Turkish construction contracts. The NATO-led intervention fractured Libya into rival governments.

Western-aligned states – including Egypt, France, Israel, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, the UK, and the US – backed the eastern-based Libyan National Army (LNA). Russia and Syria, under Bashar al-Assad, opposed NATO’s intervention and played no part in Gaddafi’s overthrow.

After Gaddafi’s violent fall from power, Turkiye and Qatar backed the Islamist-oriented Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA). By 2020, with the GNA besieged in Tripoli, Ankara intervened directly: deploying Bayraktar TB2 drones, troops, and Syrian mercenaries, breaking the siege in months.

Today, Turkiye still maintains roughly 3,000 troops in Libya.

In 2019, Ankara signed a maritime delimitation deal with the GNA, forming part of Turkiye’s ‘Blue Homeland’ doctrine aimed at asserting control over eastern Mediterranean waters, although this is largely rhetorical rather than operational. Enforcement has been limited by strong geopolitical pushback and unresolved legal disputes.

The agreement came as plans were drafted for Israel to create a natural gas pipeline to supply Turkiye’s foes, Southern Cyprus and Greece.

With a Libyan-Turkish maritime corridor now cutting off Greece from the rest of West Asia, this is no longer possible. Its legality is contested, given the GNA’s disputed mandate and objections from Greece, Cyprus, and Egypt.

In June, Libya’s National Oil Company (NOC) signed a memorandum of understanding with TPAO to conduct a geological and geophysical study of four offshore areas, while the rival eastern administration has reportedly agreed to review the 2019 maritime deal. Last month, the GNA enhanced its military ties with Turkiye, extending Ankara’s security role and formalizing its long-term military presence.

Sudan: Playing both sides, leaning to one

Sudan’s 2023 civil war pitted the UAE-backed Rapid Support Forces (RSF) against the Egyptian and Saudi-backed Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). Turkiye sold arms to both but leaned toward the SAF, delivering $120m in Bayraktar TB2 drones with Turkish operators. Alongside Iranian drones, these proved critical in helping the besieged SAF to capture key cities in 2024.

In January 2025, Somalia agreed to let SAF troops train at Camp TURKSOM, and in April, SAF leader Abdel Fattah al-Burhan visited Turkiye.

SAF support aligns with Turkiye’s other goals in Africa and West Asia. The LNA is one of the only actors supporting the RSF. With a SAF victory, Turkiye could use Sudan as a proxy to fight the LNA across the Sudanese-Libyan border.

Turkiye is also fighting a proxy war with the UAE in Syria, with the former backing the Al-Qaeda rooted government and the latter accused of backing the US-backed, Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces. Putting pressure on the RSF means dragging the UAE away from Syria. In return, the SAF has signaled its long-term commitment to Ankara, unexpectedly recognizing the sovereignty of its ally Kosovo in April.

A SAF victory could position Turkiye along the Red Sea, but its 99-year lease on Suakin Island, signed in 2018, remains stalled due to RSF attacks. Suakin, once a thriving Ottoman port, features heavily in Ankara’s neo-Ottoman rhetoric, yet its transformation into a functioning naval and trade hub remains distant.

The Sahel: Cautious partners in a bigger game

The Confederation of Sahel States (CSS) – Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger – formed after anti-imperialist coups expelled French and US forces. Each faces entrenched insurgencies by Al-Qaeda and Islamic State affiliates.

Russia is their primary security partner. NATO-member Turkiye’s role has been limited: light arms, armored vehicles, modest trade deals, and offers of drone training. In May, Burkina Faso signed a defense and trade accord with Ankara, and last month, Niger explored cooperation on security and energy.

Trade with Mali has also surged from just $5 million in 2003 to $165 million in 2022, and Mali’s Security Minister has now received an invitation from Turkiye’s Interior Minister.

Unsurprisingly, Turkiye’s assistance to the CSS has yielded limited results, as Al-Qaeda and Islamic State affiliates continue to expand. Syrian mercenaries brought in under Turkish contracts have proven unfit – or unwilling – to fight fellow militants.

The much-hyped Bayraktar drones are not invincible; one of Mali’s two was shot down between late March and early April. Turkiye’s presence has also alienated potential partners: Algeria, long an anti-imperialist actor, has grown hostile toward the CSS since Turkiye’s arrival on its borders. Tensions spiked after Algeria shot down Mali’s drone, prompting Bamako to accuse Algiers of supporting terrorism.

Amid these setbacks, Niger allegedly suspended intelligence cooperation with Turkiye in June, though the two resumed talks a month later and agreed to expand military cooperation. Burkina Faso withdrew exploration rights for two Turkish mines last year, only to sign new cooperation deals soon after.

For Ankara, the CSS relationship still delivers strategic value, from access to uranium and gold to acting as a NATO member conduit for western interests now seeking indirect entry into the bloc’s anti-imperialist strongholds.

Neo-Ottomanism in Africa

From Mogadishu to Tripoli to Khartoum, Turkiye’s African footprint is growing, but mainly in unstable states and contested arenas. It is far from controlling Africa’s sea lanes or replacing western hegemony.

Domestic controversies, from Somali legal scandals to Libya policy criticisms, weigh on Ankara’s credibility. In the Sahel, Moscow remains the preferred partner for anti-imperialist governments.

Turkiye’s drive in Africa blends humanitarian outreach, military positioning, and selective alliance-building. Until it broadens beyond fragile partners and turns its neo-Ottoman vision into sustainable influence, Ankara will remain an ambitious player – not the hegemon it imagines itself to be.

The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Cradle.