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Posted in: Long Posts on Wednesday, 15th October 2014 – by Joris Couvreur*
Source: europeangeostrategy.org/2014/10/syria-war-isis-pandoras-box-beginning-end-game/

The civil war in Syria has produced multiple ungoverned spaces, an ideal breeding ground for militant groups such as Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), an offspring of the al-Qaeda branch in Iraq. Within a short period of time this organisation has emerged from the chaotic situation in the Middle East as a threat to the region and beyond. Consequently the United States (US) President felt compelled to outline a comprehensive and sustained counterterrorism strategy with different components to degrade and ultimately destroy ISIS, not only in Iraq but also in Syria. Its proclaimed ‘caliphate’ already controls a sizeable population and includes a large area of eastern Syria, as well as of northern and western Iraq. Its barbaric practices have set-off alarm bells and mobilised governments across the world.

The decision to bomb Syria backed up by an international coalition with a strong regional input (several Sunni Arab countries) raises a host of questions. Will this military campaign not bolster the position of Assad, deepen the sectarian divide between Sunnis and Shiites in the region and thus prolong indefinitely the present low-intensity conflict? Or is this the beginning of the end-game for the Assad regime at a moment when events appear to be moving in its direction?

The objectives: some questions

There exists a lack of coherence in the objectives pursued by the present American strategy. Indeed, the West does not want to cooperate with the Assad regime. But Assad holds several cards in the fight against ISIS (expertise on its location, command structures, combat methods). Will Assad want to cooperate seriously if at the same time the US is involved in a ‘train and equip’ programme in favour of the moderate opposition whose objective it is to overthrow him? On the other hand to what extent will the rebels be prepared to fully commit themselves in the fight against ISIS? They want to get rid of Assad. Moreover, can the military capacity of the moderate Syrian opposition be considered a ‘counterweight’ to ISIS? Does a ‘moderate’ opposition still exist today? In the beginning the insurgents, the ‘Free Syrian Army’ (FSA), worked together with the radicals, arguing that once the regime had fallen they would tackle the militants. Will the regional coalition allow the Assad regime to continue bombing the rebels, ex in Aleppo, while at the same time joining Assad in bombing ISIS? Is there a risk that the US and its western allies will become direct players in a Sunni Gulf-led war on Shiites? These are not encouraging prospects.

The campaign: some thoughts on ways and means

There appears to be an understanding between partners, including Syria, concerning the attack on ISIS. Assad made it clear that rather than criticising these attacks (unlike Iran and Russia) he supports them. For him, the regional coalition and Syria are on the same side. The Syrian military presumably possess intelligence on the whereabouts, command structures and fighting methods of ISIS that will be useful in a later phase when individual leaders are targeted. Indeed, these fighters are resourceful in melting away among the civilian population.

An indispensable partner on the ground is necessary. Indeed, the job cannot be done from the air only. To a certain extent the Syrian military will perform this role as well as the Syrian Kurds who nevertheless are affiliated to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). In the struggle against ISIS, Turkey will not want the Syrian Kurds to strengthen their claims to an independent state or even to an autonomous Kurdish-area on its border with Syria. Turkish interests and objectives (a buffer and no-fly zone in northern Syria and more focus on toppling Assad) will thus have an impact on the cohesiveness of the campaign. However, in the medium term the most credible alternative in the present context – extensive infiltration of opposition ranks on the ground by radical Islam and rejection of any ground forces by the West – seems to be the ‘Military Operations Command’ (MOC) set up on the Jordanian and Turkish borders with Syria under US supervision. This Command already maintains direct links with rebel commanders on the ground, thus sidestepping the FSA. From these bases local fighters, vetted by the coalition, trained in Saudi Arabia and over time increased in numbers, will be launched. As such the moderate Syrian opposition would represent a ‘third way’ between Assad and ISIS since it is unlikely that the MCC will not be used against the regime. Indeed, the survival of ISIS or of Assad on a medium term basis would undermine the coalition’s credibility. This channel would also give western countries a stake in the outcome. Meanwhile strikes should be strictly targeted at ISIS (not other groups) and coordination mechanisms with the existing military opposition (FSA) arranged so that the coalition’s objectives do not adversely affect the efforts of the insurgents.
The military campaign will last for a considerable length of time. The regional Arab partners, vital to the success of the operation, will have to continue in their unwavering support even though their interests do not always converge. Border surveillance with the active cooperation of Iraq, Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon will be a key factor. Under these circumstances it should become more difficult for countries such as Russia and Iran to transfer arms and for Hezbollah to join the fighters.
The political component is an essential dimension of the whole strategy. Widespread support among the population for the non-radical opposition will have to emerge from more balance on the ground in the wake of military gains by a ‘reinvigorated’ moderate opposition. This will take time. In the words of President Obama: ‘the solution to Syria is political; an inclusive political transition that responds to the legitimate aspirations of all Syrians’.
A strong ideological input is necessary to counter the belief that the present military campaign is an attack on Islam and its core values such as human dignity, social justice and tolerance. In this context a fully sustainable military effort from Arab Muslim countries of the coalition in the region is essential. In contrast to Iraq, which requested assistance from the international community in its fight against ISIS but also made it clear it does not need foreign ground troops, Syria gave no permission for strikes nor was a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution adopted. Thus regional Arab partners are vital if the West does not want to be accused of waging war on Islam. Furthermore, unlike the present situation in Iraq, the Syrians, renowned for their trading skills, have not favoured radical Islam, even if among Sunni Arabs, 65 percent of the population, the (once considered) more moderate form of Islam, ‘the Muslim Brothers’ (MB), do enjoy considerable support, especially in areas around Aleppo and Hama. On the other hand, ideological and other arguments will be important in attempting to deter young Sunnis in western countries in joining the battlefield in the Middle East. Indeed, those ungoverned spaces in Syria offer a breeding ground for fighters to attack Western Europe and North America.

The enemy of my enemy is not my friend but my enemy: possible end-game?

Allowing for these considerations, it cannot be ruled out that rolling back ISIS – given the lack of support by Syrians for radical Islam – will turn out to be a less demanding task than getting rid of Assad. However, chances are that thanks to extensive air cover the balance of power will eventually turn the tide in favour of the increasing number of insurgents on the ground. Under these circumstances there is no reason why important sections of the population, sensing that the regime is losing ground and that the tide is turning, would not start switching allegiances and jump on the bandwagon. Arms deliveries from Russia and Iran as well as Hezbollah fighters would have more trouble entering Syria. These developments could induce Assad, with some Russian and Iranian prodding – dependent on the nuclear issue –, to return to the negotiating table. Thus the political peace process could be restarted under more balanced conditions than those prevailing in January 2014 in Geneva and the strategy against ISIS could produce an unexpected side-effect.

*Honorary Ambassador Joris Couvreur is a decorated former career diplomat with the Belgian Foreign Ministry. Among many other postings, he served as Belgian Ambassador to Damascus, Bogota, Belgrade and Quito. He writes here in a personal capacity.